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Recent Developments

Young v. State:
Supreme Court's Holding In Apprendi Does Not Apply to Sex Offender Registry

By: Chrys P. Kefalas
n a case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held the Supreme Court's
holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not
apply to sex offender registry.
Youngv. State, 370 Md. 686, 690,
806 A.2d 233, 235 (2002). In so
holding, the court determined
Maryland's Registration of Offenders statute, which requires certain
convicted defendants to register as
sex offenders, is not punishment,
and does not violate due process
rights enunciated in Apprendi. Id.
at 716, 806 A.2d at 250.
In the summer of 1999,
Jessica McGregor ("McGregor"), a
sixteen-year-old girl, met Jessie Lee
Young ("Young"), a thirty-four-yearold man who ran an escort service
in New York. Young, with knowledge that McGregor was a minor,
allowed her to join his escort service
as a prostitute. During the first week
of September 1999, Young and
McGregor moved to metropolitan
Washington D.C., where McGregor
continued to work as a prostitute.
Young was convicted in the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County for transporting a person
for the purposes of prostitution in
violation of Md. Code Art. 27,
section 432 (1996 & Supp. 2000).
The statutory maximum sentence
was ten years. The circuit court
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sentenced Young to ten years, with
credit for time served, and all but
eight years suspended. Additionally,
the court placed Young on five years
probation and ordered, pursuant to
Md. Code Art. 27, section 792
(1996 & Supp. 2000) that he
register as a sexual offender.
Young appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland,
challenging the registration requirement. The court of special
appeals affirmed. Young filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari, which
was granted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The major issue before the
court of appeals was whether Md.
Code Art. 27, section 792 (1996
& Supp. 2000) is a punitive statute
that imposes a sanction triggering a
right to a jury trial and the right to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt
under Apprendi. Young, 370 Md.
at 693, 806 A.2d at 237.
Accordingly, the court began its
analysis by reviewing the Supreme
Court's landmark Apprendi decision. Id. at 695, 806 A.2d at 238.
In Apprendi, the Supreme
Court held "[0 ]ther than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 696, 806

A.2d at 239. Thus, the court
stressed in order for Young's
challenge to succeed, he must
demonstrate the following independent elements: (1) the sex offender
registry constitutes punishment; (2)
factual findings in question expose
Young to a greater penalty than the
prescribed statutory minimum; and
(3) "that such factual prerequisites
invo lve facts' other than the fact of
a prior conviction. '" Id. at 696-97,
806 A.2d at 239.
The court had not previously
considered any case that addressed
whether the sex offender registration statute violates due process
in light of Apprendi. Id. at 697,
806 A.2d at 239. Accordingly, the
court turned to both state and
federal case law from other
jurisdictions. Id. Other jurisdictions dealt with whether registration
and notification provisions of sex
offender registration statutes or civil
and forfeiture provisions constitute
punishment for ex post facto,
double jeopardy, and cruel and
unusual punishment purposes.
Young, 370 Md. at 697, 806 A.2d
at 239. The court concluded the
"overwhelming body of judicial
precedent" demonstrates that sex
offender registration is not
punishment. Id.
The common thread underlying the case precedent was the
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application ofthe Usery-Hendricks
"intent-effects test." Id. at 702-07,
806 A.2d 242-46. In determining
whether registration under Section
792 constitutes punishment, the
court applied the following two-part
test: (1) whether the Legislature
intended the sanction as punitive;
and (2) whether there is "clearest
proof' the statute is "so punitive" in
effect as to prevent the court from
legitimately viewing it as regulatory
or civil in nature, despite the
Legislature's intent. Id. at 702-03,
806 A.2d at 242.
To decipher the Legislature's
intent, the court examined the
legislation's declared purpose and
the statute's text and structure. Id.
at 711-12, 806 A.2d at 248. The
court noted Section 792 contained
no express statement of purpose.
Id. at 712, 806 A.2d at 248.
However, the court found the "plain
language" and design of the statute
"clearly indicated that it was not
intended as punishment" but as a
regulatory requirement intended to
protect the public. Young, 370 Md.
at 712,806 A.2d at 248.
The court's next step
determined whether, despite the
Legislature's intent, Section 792 was
"so punitive" in effect to prevent the
court from legitimately viewing it as
remedial in nature. Id. at 712-13,
806 A.2d at 249. The court applied
the following Mendoza-Martinez
factors: (1) whether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or
restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into
play only on a finding of scienter;
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(4) whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of
punishment -- retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior
to which it applies is already a
crime; (6) whether it lacks an
alternative purpose to which it
rationally may be connected; and
(7) if such alternative does exist,
whether the statute appears
excessive in relation to it. Id at 698,
806 A.2d at 240.
Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the court concluded
the effect of Section 792 was not
"so punitive" as to outweigh the
Legislature's remedial purpose. Id.
at 714, 806 A.2d at 50. It noted
the statute's physical restraints are
minimal, emphasizing the affected
person's movements are not restricted in any way and the information required to register does not
impose an unreasonable burden.
Id. at 713, 806 A.2d at 249. In
addition, the court stated while the
stigma associated with registration
is an affirmative disability, "the
burden is not so unreasonable, in
light ofthe statute's remedial aims,
that it converts the statute to a
punitive one." Id. Furthermore, it
found sex offender registration was
not traditionally regarded as
punishment and the statute
contained no scienter requirement.
Young, 370 Md. at 714-15, 806
A.2d at 250.
The court acknowledged that
registration requirements further the
aim of deterrence. Id. at 715,806
A.2d at 250. Nevertheless, the
court found the statute had legitimate purposes other than punish-

ment, including protecting the public,
and alerting law enforcement and
surrounding community to sexual
offenders who may reoffend. Id.
The court also asserted the statute
was narrowly tailored to protect the
public from sex offenders. Id.
Finally, the court dealt squarely
with whether the factual findings
required under Section 792
exposed the defendant to a greater
penalty than the prescribed
statutory maximum. Id. at 716, 806
A.2d at 251. In holding that it did
not, the court stated the fact
McGregor was under the age of
eighteen is not "a fact that increases
[the sentence]." Id. In fact, the trial
court sentenced Young to ten years,
the statutory maximum, but suspended two years and ordered
Young to register as a sex offender
as a condition of probation. Young,
370 Md. at 716,806 A.2d at 251.
Thus, the court stated "Apprendi
does not apply to a case in which a
trial court imposes a discretionary
sentence within the permissible
statutory range." Id.
The Court ofAppeals of Maryland, as a matter of first impression,
held the Supreme Court's holding in
Apprendi v. New Jersey does not
apply to sex offender registration.
In so holding, the court settled the
issue of sex offender registration in
light of Apprendi 's criminal due
process implications in Maryland.
However, Maryland practitioners
should be aware, the court remained
silent on new internet notification
requirements and their Fourteenth
Amendment due process implications.

